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Developmental System Theory is a theoretical reinterpretation of biological phenomena 
challenging the conventional gene-centered account of development and evolution. In this 
paper, I focus on Griffiths and Gray’s version of Developmental Systems Theory and I 
particularly analyze their reconceptualization of inheritance. First, I present their concept of 
expanded and diffused inheritance; then, I examine and criticize their refusal of the multiple 
inheritance system model; finally, I present and contrast Griffiths and Gray’s extension of 
what they call the “causal parity thesis” from development to evolution. I argue that their 
proposal is an interesting and programmatic philosophical perspective on biological 
phenomena but, because of their commitment to holism, fails to provide both more heuristic 
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Introduction 
Developmental System Theory (DST) is a label used by Griffiths and Gray (1994) to 
designate a reinterpretation of biological phenomena rejecting all dichotomous accounts of 
development and evolution1. More precisely, proponents of Developmental Systems Theory 
challenge the conventional gene-centric version of the Synthetic theory of evolution, 
according to which only genes, among determinants of phenotype, play a privileged causal 
role in evolution and carry the program for development, because it is “centered on a 
dichotomy between genes on the one hand and every other causal factor on the other” 
(Griffiths and Gray 2001: 197).  
Griffiths and Gray’ see their contribution to such a “theoretical reworking of 
biological concepts” (Oyama, Griffiths, Gray 2001: 1) as an improvement of Oyama’s general 
reinterpretation of development and evolution (Oyama 1985): their aim is to “confront one 
major weakness of previous presentations of the developmental systems idea – the lack of any 
way of delimiting and individuating developmental systems” (Griffiths and Gray 1994: 278). 
In line with the developmental systems tradition, Griffiths and Gray propose to discard the 
conventional account of development and evolution because it tends to distinguish resources 
into two fundamentally different kinds (e.g. genes-environment, nature-nurture, biology-
                                                
1 Griffiths and Gray (1994: 278) claim that “Many authors have contributed to the developmental systems, or 
constructionist, tradition in the study of development. We have drawn on this tradition, and particularly on the 
work of Susan Oyama, to produce a general account of development and evolution”. Oyama, Griffiths and Gray 
(2001: 2) also stress that “Developmental systems theory is not attributable to one person or group. It draws on 
insights from researchers in a wide range of area who have been dissatisfied with crude dichotomous accounts of 
development and have attempted to formulate an alternative”. For more details about researchers belonging to 
DST or influencing it, see  Oyama, Griffiths and Gray (2001: 9) and Griffiths and Gray (1994: 278, note 1). 
 4 
culture); rather, they suggest doing biology without such dichotomies. They do not simply 
propose new definitions for some central concepts in biology; they conceive a new general 
perspective on development, inheritance and evolution, and advance it as the basis for a new 
biological theory. Such a theoretical framework (DST) stresses the interactive and systemic 
character of all aspects of biological reality: according to Griffiths and Gray, it is a novel and 
more realistic representation of biological phenomena, and it can inspire new powerful paths 
in experimental research2.  
In this paper, I focus on Griffiths and Gray’s version of Developmental Systems 
Theory; in particular, I examine their proposal to redefine inheritance and its effects on the 
theory of evolution. Since inheritance can be considered as the interface between 
development and evolution, its reconcepualization seems to me a privileged point of view in 
order to understand in which sense and to what extent Griffiths and Gray’s theoretical 
perspective for biology moves away from the Synthetic theory of evolution.  
My primary aim is to show that, even though Griffiths and Gray’s proposal represents 
an interesting and programmatic attempt to advance a new philosophical perspective on 
biological phenomena, they fail both to provide new heuristic tools for the empirical study of 
                                                
2 Oyama, Griffiths and Gray’s (2001: 1-2) claim that Developmental Systems Theory “is not a theory in the 
sense of a specific model that produces predictions to be tested against rival models. Instead, it is […] a 
framework both for conducting scientific research and for understanding the broader significance of research 
findings”. Nevertheless, Griffiths and Gray (1992, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2005) seem to suggest more 
than that (anyway, more than what Oyama (2000a, 2000b) suggests, i.e., a Developmental Systems Perspective 
or Approach, rather than Theory) because they repeatedly use the label “Developmental Systems Theory” and 
because, as I have just said, they stress that their reconceptualization both can provide alternative research 
programs for experimental investigation and more realistic theoretical models to represent biological 
phenomena. 
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inheritance and evolution3 and to better grasp and represent biological phenomena, because of 
their commitment to holism (loosely speaking, the idea that, since everything causally 
depends on everything else, we cannot understand something without understanding 
everything)4. By these terms, I do not want to claim that Griffiths and Gray’s criticisms 
against the conventional version of the Synthetic Theory of evolution are uninteresting. 
Rather, I suggest that, by refusing important distinctions and differences among hereditary 
and evolutionary factors, Griffiths and Gray weaken the main potential of their criticisms 
against some dogmatic aspects of the traditional paradigm. 
In the first part of this paper, I present the main features of Griffiths and Gray’s 
redefinition of the concept of inheritance. In the second part, I particularly examine and 
criticize Griffiths and Gray’s refusal to distinguish multiple systems, or channels, of 
inheritance in the name of their “constructive interactionism”. In contrast with their ideas, I 
show the value of such a distinction as a heuristic tool for experimental research and as a 
more realistic representation of the phenomena of inheritance and evolution. In the third and 
final part, I present and criticize Griffiths and Gray’s extension of what they call the “causal 
parity” thesis (or, “causal democracy”, Oyama 2000b) from development to the case of 
evolution. I show that their radical refusal of dichotomies, in particular between genes and all 
                                                
3 In particular, if we compare Griffiths and Gray’s proposal with other conceptions of extended inheritance (e.g. 
Sterelny et al’s “extended replicator” model, 1996; Laland, Odling-Smee, Feldman’s works on niche 
construction or ecological inheritance; Jablonka and Lamb’s distinction of four dimensions or systems of 
inheritance, 2001, 2005). 
4 Different criticisms against the holistic character of Griffiths and Gray’s version of Developmental Systems 
Theory are developed in Sterelny et al (1996), Kitcher (2001), Griesemer et al (2005) et Waters (2006).  
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the other extra-genetic factors, leads them to drop some important evolutionary differences 
among hereditary factors.5   
 
I) Griffiths and Gray’s reformulation of the concept of inheritance 
Griffiths and Gray claim that the traditional concept of inheritance needs “substantial 
reformulation” because it is based on dichotomies between genes and other developmental 
factors which are not grounded on empirical differences, but on “the metaphysical distinction 
between ‘form’ and ‘matter’ ” (Griffiths and Gray 2004: 415, Griffiths and Knight 1998). Let 
us consider in details their proposal. 
First, they reformulate the concept of inheritance in opposition to the traditional 
population genetics’ conception of evolution as change in gene frequency: they oppose the 
idea that inheritance is the passing on and changing of master molecules (genes, or DNA 
sequences) considered as the only carriers of information for development, and so the only 
factors playing a causal role in evolution. Their privileged target is Dawkins’ interpretation of 
the theory of evolution, namely the idea of “extended phenotype”: “The facts of evolution do 
not justify a special role for DNA sequences as ‘replicators’ whilst membranes are lumped 
together with every thing from methyl groups to human culture as ‘interactors’” (Griffiths and 
Knight 1998: 254). The second reason leading Griffiths and Gray to reformulate the concept 
of inheritance is the absence of developmental considerations from the Synthetic theory of 
evolution: according to them, by reintroducing development into the evolutionary theory 
through a reconcepualization of inheritance, biologists should be able to pay the appropriate 
                                                
5 As I said above, the core of my criticisms precisely concerns Griffiths and Gray’s version of Developmental 
Systems Theory. Nevertheless, I will also refer to some papers by Oyama in order to better clarify Griffiths and 
Gray’s perspective. 
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attention to a variety of factors playing equally important roles in development and in 
evolution. 
 On these bases, Griffiths and Gray propose a “principled” definition of inheritance 
justified by the meta-theoretical claim that “the concept of inheritance is used to explain the 
stability of biological form from one generation to the next” (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 196)6. 
Thus, according to them, inheritance is “the reliable reproduction of developmental resources 
down the lineage” (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 214) and this concept applies to “any resource 
that is reliably present in successive generations, and is part of the explanation of why each 
generation resembles the last” (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 196).   
First of all, it is important to clarify that Griffiths and Gray do not use the expression 
“reproduction of developmental resources” according to its standard meaning, i.e. by referring 
to the replication of hereditary factors and their material transmission from parents to 
offspring; rather, by the term “reproduction” they mean the reappearance or the reconstruction 
of developmental resources in successive generations. Actually, one of the most important 
novelties of Griffiths and Gray’s reconcepualization of inheritance is the refusal of the notion 
of transmission and its substitution with the notion of stability. More precisely, Griffiths and 
Gray move away from the idea of “hereditary transmission of traits or coded representations 
of traits” (i.e., genes), and even completely “relinquish the conviction that traits can be 
transmitted at all” (Oyama 2000a: 6) because, according to them, the notion of transmission is 
deeply-rooted in the dualistic tradition of the Synthetic theory assuming the dichotomies 
between nature and nurture, organism and environment, development and evolution. They 
refuse the distinction between, on the one hand, a blueprint (i.e., nature) considered as the 
only factor passed on from parents to offspring and the privileged carrier of a program for 
                                                
6 Griffiths and Gray’s concept of expanded inheritance “in principle” fits in with the goal of the traditional 
notion of inheritance: both are used to explain the correlation of resemblance between parents and offspring. 
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development and, on the other hand, a standard background of other inputs to development. 
They claim that such a distinction is a residual form of pre-formationism because it considers 
transmitted factors (e.g., genes) as containing all the relevant information to construct 
offspring like their parents. Furthermore, they also radically reject extending the use of the 
notion of transmission to extra-genetic hereditary factors because transmission is simply a 
metaphor implying a denial of development (Oyama 2000a: 70).  
For these reasons, Griffiths and Gray defy the traditional dichotomy-based perspective 
on inheritance, development and evolution, and argue that “nature” is not genotypic and 
transmitted, but phenotypic and constructed at each generation through developmental 
interactions they call “nurture”7. By resolving the nature-nurture dichotomy in this way, 
Griffiths and Gray intend to do justice to the facts of development and to assess the 
evolutionary potential of various forms of inheritance. They move to a concept of expanded 
inheritance by replacing the notion of transmission with the notion of stability of 
developmental resources and interactions in successive generations. More precisely, they use 
the term “stability” to mean reliable presence, reoccurrence, reconstruction, of developmental 
resources and interactions at each generation: “developmental means are transmitted in the 
sense of being available during reproduction and ontogeny” (Oyama 2000a).  
So, what does an organism inherit according to Griffiths and Gray’s definition of 
inheritance? Much more than just nuclear DNA! More precisely, their definition entails a 
radical expansion of the concept of inheritance which turns out to apply to the following 
genetic and extra-genetic developmental resources: environmental-physical resources 
persisting independently from organisms (more precisely, what is inherited is the interaction 
                                                
7 “All phenotypes are constructed, not transmitted […] Not only are traits not directly transmitted across 
generations, nor are blueprints, potentials, programs or information for the traits. Instead, all phenotypes must 
develop through organism-environment transactions” (Gray 1992: 177). 
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with persistent resources affecting the organisms, e.g., gravity for organisms of big size; 
Brownian motion for microorganisms); resources collectively generated by the members of a 
population (e.g., behavioral and social traditions, some features of the habitat like nests, dams, 
etc.); resources due to parents (e.g., genes, endosymbionts, chromatin marks, cytoplasm 
including organelles, membrane structures, antibodies and mithocondria, behaviors); 
resources self-generated during the developmental process (e.g., proteins produced by gene 
expression). All these developmental resources and their reciprocal interactions are inherited, 
i.e. “stable” from one generation to the next. According to Griffiths and Gray, they explain 
the stability of biological forms across generations and constitute what they call the 
“Developmental System” (DS): they represent the set of developmental resources and 
interactions (i.e., developmental factors) participating in the reconstruction of the 
developmental process, or life cycle, in each generation (Griffiths and Gray 1994: 285). 
Even though the extension of the hereditary package to include more than nuclear 
DNA is actually recognized by biologists8, Griffiths and Gray’s proposal represents a further 
expansion of the concept of inheritance because, as I already said above, it applies not only to 
extra-genetic intracellular factors (Sterelny et al 1996, Jablonka and Lamb 2005) and to extra-
genetic factors due to the “niche construction” activity (Laland, Odling-Smee, Feldman 
2003), but also to resources generated during the developmental process of organisms.  
Moreover, Griffiths and Gray consider “processes” (interactions) as inherited 
developmental factors across generations. This is an important consequence of the theoretical 
perspective for biology they advance, which assigns a primary importance to the dynamic 
interaction and the context-dependence of all biological phenomena. Actually, they take it a 
step further rejecting the very distinction between organism and environment: in contrast with 
the traditional view, organism and environment “interpenetrate” (Oyama 2000a: 3) and form a 
                                                
8 However, extra-genetic inheritance has not yet been introduced into population genetics’ models of evolution. 
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dynamic and interactive organism-environment system (Œ) – i.e., the Developmental System 
(DS) - evolving as a whole. 
It is also worth noting that, despite such an extension of the concept of inheritance, 
Griffiths and Gray do not particularly investigate the mechanism(s) by means of which the 
system of developmental resources and interactions (DS) reoccurs more or less reliably at 
each generation (i.e., is inherited over generations). They reject Dawkins’ distinction between 
“replicators” and “vehicules” (or “interactors”, in Hull’s terms) which is grounded on “the 
supposed asymmetry between the role of genes and the role of other developmental 
resources” (Griffiths and Gray 1994: 299); moreover, they want to “evaporate” such an 
asymmetry and to completely stop talking in terms of “replicator” and “interactor” because 
such a dichotomy implies a privileged causal role in development and in evolution for some 
factors (replicators) over the others.  
Griffiths and Gray also refuse the “extended replicator” perspective (Sterelny et al 
1996) according to which genes are not the only replicators. However, in order to answer 
Sterelny et al’s (1996) criticisms to Developmental Systems Theory and to criticize their 
distinction of a variety of replicators, Griffiths and Gray use the term “replicator” in claiming 
that “according to the developmental system theory, all developmental interactions are 
replicated as part of the replications of the developmental process/life cycle. […]”; in fact, “if 
we insist that a replicator have the intrinsic causal power to replicate itself, there will be only 
one replicator, the life cycle”.  
In what does the developmental process’ “intrinsic causal power to replicate itself” 
consist? First, Griffiths and Gray do not use the term “replicator” referring to special factors 
able to produce more or less reliable copies of themselves (Hull and Wilkins 2005); rather, by 
this term they designate the process of reconstruction, at each generation, of the 
developmental process through the interactions among inherited developmental factors. 
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Second, they sometimes try to specify more precisely what kind of constructive process is in 
question in inheritance (i.e., how the developmental process reconstructs itself in each 
generation) by claiming that “the process is self-organizing” (Gray 1992: 181): “species-
typical traits are construed by a structured set of species-typical developmental resources in a 
self-organizing process” (Griffiths and Gray 1994: 181). Nevertheless, Griffiths and Gray fail 
in providing an explanation of what they mean by “self-organization” because they do not 
introduce any analytic physico-chemical description of how such a biological mechanism 
should work9.  
 
II) Griffiths and Gray’s concept of diffused inheritance: how to deal with it 
in biology? 
In this second part, let us examine Griffiths and Gray’s refusal to distinguish multiple 
systems, or channels, of inheritance in interaction10. Griffiths and Gray do not simply reject 
the traditional idea that inheritance is localized in some genetic factors; they also refuse any 
particular or privileged localization of inheritance and, by contrast, they propose a concept of 
diffused inheritance11 according to which organisms do not inherit many factors but the entire 
                                                
9 This point is further discussed in Barberousse (this issue). 
10 Griffiths and Gray particularly refuse the idea that the interactions among systems of inheritance are mere 
additive. Anyway, they radically move away from the idea that we could distinguish different systems of 
inheritance, even if their interactions are considered as non-additive (non-linear). They claim that one of the 
main motivations to refuse the distinction of multiple systems in interaction is “to draw attention to fact that 
developmental causes do not have their effects in isolation, but as part of a wider system of causes”. Therefore, 
“the very idea of separate systems” is inadequate because it “suggests autonomy” (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 197-
198). According to Griffiths and Gray, Developmental Systems Theory provides a new conceptual framework 
that avoids this. 
11 Or, “a ‘systemsy’ notion of heredity”, Griesemer et al 2005: 524. 
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developmental matrix (i.e., the system of resources and interactions participating to the 
reconstruction of the developmental process). In this manner, they want to stress the 
intertwined relation and the interdependence among genetic and extra-genetic hereditary 
developmental factors, not only in the developmental process, but also in inheritance across 
generations: they claim that it is “more biologically realistic and, in the long run, more 
productive to think of the life cycle being reconstructed by a system of resources” (Griffiths 
and Gray 2001: 196). 
In opposition to Griffiths and Gray’s “constructive interactionism”, I argue that, even 
if we adopt the idea that what is inherited is not a set of distinct factors but a whole system of 
non-linear (i.e., non-additive) interactions among developmental factors, it is heuristically and 
realistically important12 to distinguish some sub-systems of inheritance on the basis of what 
we could call their “quasi-independence”: such sub-systems should be identified by the 
interactions among their respective own elements, which would be stronger than the 
interactions among elements belonging to different sub-systems. Anyway, to say that different 
sub-systems of inheritance are quasi-independent from each other does not mean that they 
could subsist and function in complete isolation from each other. For instance, genes could 
not replicate and pass on from parents to offspring, and could not participate to the 
developmental process, if they were not surrounded and supported by all the other non-
genetic developmental factors. The quasi-independence of sub-systems of inheritance allows 
us to describe, analyze and explain them independently from the others; however, their 
                                                
12 I use the terms “heuristic” and “realistic” respectively in relation to the methods used to solve a problem and 
to characterize the match of a real phenomenon and its representation (model).  
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reciprocal interactions have to be considered too, in order to be integrated in the description, 
the analysis and the explanation of the whole system of inheritance.13  
Biologists currently apply this kind of distinction in experimental and theoretical 
research. Through some examples, I intend to argue that the distinction of different systems of 
inheritance is not simply heuristically useful for empirical studies, but it is also important as 
realistic representations of biological inheritance: such a distinction allows biologists to better 
investigate, represent, and explain the relative independence of diverse aspects of inheritance 
and their reciprocal influences. Griffiths and Gray’s claim that each developmental factor 
depends on the presence and functionality of the others seems to me trivially true and a weak 
basis to argue, as Griffiths and Gray do, against the importance of distinctions in experimental 
and theoretical biology.  
In their later book (2005), Jablonka and Lamb distinguish four systems, or dimensions, 
of inheritance and analyze their reciprocal interactions. It is in virtue of such a distinction that 
they can proceed to analyze and explain the interplay among different systems of inheritance 
(their respective quasi-independence and their reciprocal influences). For instance, they 
examine the relationship between what they call the genetic system and a variety of epigenetic 
systems of inheritance14 (Jablonka and Lamb 2005: chapter 7). On the one hand, epigenetic 
                                                
13 Griesemer et al (2005: 526-528) provide a different argument in favor of the distinction of multiple systems of 
inheritance. First, they argue for the compatibility of multi-system models with the context-dependence of each 
system on the others; second, they stress the important difference between the separateness of some factors in 
interaction and their causal or statistical independence. Griesemer et al’s argument turns out to partially support 
Griffiths and Gray’s conception of inheritance because they conclude that the distinction of multiple systems of 
inheritance is compatible with the characterization of inheritance in a holistic way. 
14 Jablonka and Lamb (2005, chapter 4) distinguish different kinds of epigenetic systems of inheritance: the 
inheritance of patterns of gene activity (self-sustaining loops), the inheritance of cell structure, the chromatin-
marking system of inheritance, the inheritance of silencing of specific genes by RNA interference. 
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systems can have different types of effects on the genetic system: “epigenetic marks affect not 
only gene activity”, they also can directly bias the generation of variation by affecting “the 
probability that the DNA region will undergo genetic change” (Jablonka and lamb 2005: 246-
250); epigenetic changes induced by changing environmental conditions can affect (“guide”) 
the selection of variants by revealing previously hidden genetic variation (i.e., the process of 
genetic assimilation) (Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 258-276). On the other hand, the genetic 
system of inheritance can also influence epigenetic systems “by affecting the marks genes 
carry, the nucleotide sequences of the RNAs involved in RNA interference, the amino acid 
sequences of the proteins that form heritable cell structures or have a role in self-sustaining 
loops, etc”. (Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 276).  
Jablonka and Lamb also provide many examples showing the developmental and 
evolutionary significance of the interactions between what they call the genetic system and, 
respectively, the behavioral and the cultural systems of inheritance, and they examine how 
genetic, behavioral and cultural changes impinge on each other. They describe many cases of 
co-evolution of genes and culture characterized by feedbacks between inherited genes and the 
inherited niche (i.e., the Baldwin effect15). For instance, changes in human lifestyle can 
influence changes in gene frequency, as in the case of dairying, in which cultural evolution 
leading to milk drinking has influenced the frequency of the lactase-persistence allele16 
(Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 292-296). Another similar example is the case of Tay-Sach 
disease: actually, there is evidence that Jewish habits, in particular the fact that they are often 
                                                
15 The Baldwin effect occurs when a biological trait becomes genetically fixed in a population as a result of first 
being learned. 
16 The lactose in milk has to be broken down into simple sugars in order to be easily absorbed into the 
bloodstream; this require the enzyme lactose which is coded by the lactase-persistence allele. See Durham 1991, 
who analyzes in the case of dairying how changes in human lifestyles have influenced the frequencies of some of 
their genes. 
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forced to live in slums and ghettos, have influenced the frequency of the Tay-Sachs allele 
among Ashkenazy Jews17 (Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 297-298).  
After the analysis of other cases in which the interactions and influences between the 
genetic and the cultural or the behavioral systems of inheritance play a relevant 
developmental and evolutionary role, Jablonka and Lamb conclude by claiming that: “The 
dynamics of the interactions between cultural and genetic changes is complex and difficult to 
unravel, and we made no attempt to describe them for either the milk or malaria stories. 
Common sense and lot of indirect evidence suggest that learned, socially transmitted 
behaviors occupy the driver’s seat of coevolutionary change, simply because adaptation can 
occur much more rapidly through behavior than through genetic change” (Jablonka and Lamb 
2005: 295). Thus, Jablonka and Lamb do not pretend to claim that there is evidence for the 
privileged role of one system of inheritance over the others in the evolutionary process; 
however, they simply show that such distinctions have a central value in the experimental and 
theoretical studies of inheritance because they reflect the quasi-independence of each system 
and, at the same time, they show the pathways of reciprocal influences among them (this 
point is in contrast with Griffiths and Gray’s refusal of any distinction between systems of 
inheritance).  
I argue that Jablonka and Lamb’s analysis shows that it is worth separately 
considering different systems of inheritance not simply because, in this way, it is easier for 
biologists to experimentally study them (i.e., for reasons of heuristic usefulness); rather, their 
distinction has a biologically realistic value too, as it correctly represents and allows us to 
understand the very dynamics of inheritance going on in living organisms.  
                                                
17 Tuberculosis is rife in slums and ghettos and people with the Tay-Sach allele are less likely than other people 
to develop it. 
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Another enlightening case study showing the importance of distinctions between 
systems (or quasi-independent units) of inheritance is the case of CRISPRs loci in Archaea 
and Bacteria (Makarova et al 2002, Godde and Bickerton 2006, Barrangou et al 2007). 
“CRISPRs” means Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats. These DNA 
repeats, which are about 21- 47 base pairs in length and are interspersed with non-repetitive 
sequences of similar length, have been found in a wide range of diverse prokaryotes, 
including Archaeal and Eubacterial species. Moreover, a number of cas CRISPRs-associated 
genes have also been characterized in many of the same organisms. CRISPRs, together with 
the associated cas genes, seem to provide resistance against phages (the resistance specificity 
is determined by spacer-phage sequence similarity). Phylogenetic analysis suggests that the 
CRISPRs loci have been propagated via horizontal gene transfer among very distantly related 
genomes, and that “the gene-cassette disseminated as a single entity” (Godde et al 2006: 719). 
As I have just said above, CRISPRs-containing species of prokaryotes are extremely diverse, 
belonging to the domain Archaea as well as to the majority of the phyla that have been 
sequenced from the Eubacterial domain.  
The CRISPRs case study seems to me a good example in support of the biologically 
realistic value of distinctions among different systems of inheritance, which continuously are 
in non-additive interaction but, at the same time, keep a relative autonomy (i.e., a quasi-
independence) from each other. In fact, even if CRISPRs loci could not subsist in the genome 
of diverse Prokaryotes and could not move from one organism to another in the absence of all 
the other developmental systems or factors (other genes, epigenetic factors, environmental 
extra-genetic factors, etc.), they do not strictly depend on a specific set of genetic and extra-
genetic factors, but they can move as an isolated and autonomous unit and insert in the 
genome of very different organisms (Prokaryotes belonging to the Archaea and to the 
Eubacterial domains). In other words, CRISPRs are characterized by some autonomy with 
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respect to the other genetic and extra-genetic hereditary factors as to their inheritance (i.e., 
transmission, or, in Griffiths and gray’s term, stability) from one organism to another.    
Taking the CRISPR case study as an example, I would challenge Griffiths and Gray to 
describe and explain such a phenomenon of horizontal inheritance in terms of what they call a 
“constructive interactionism” - i.e., how the DST framework, characterized by a systemic and 
interactive conception of inheritance and by the refusal of distinct systems of inheritance, 
could account for such a phenomenon of inheritance. It seems to me that Griffiths and Gray 
should be obliged to acknowledge that, for instance in the case of CRISPRs’ horizontal 
inheritance, distinctions are not only useful, but they also realistically represent the relative 
quasi-independence of some hereditary factors from the others (e.g., the relative autonomy of 
CRISPRs’ horizontal transfer). In more general terms, I question the advantage Griffiths and 
Gray’s conception of a systemic, interactive, and diffused inheritance would provide in 
comparison with other approaches distinguishing different systems of inheritance in non-
additive interaction (e.g., the four systems of inheritance, Jablonka and Lamb 2005; the 
“extended replicator” model, Sterelny et al 1996).   
As Gray says, “biologists often want to know the research implications of adopting a 
particular theoretical perspective (Gray 2001: 28). I also would ask about the research 
implications of adopting Griffiths and Gray’s concept of expanded and diffused inheritance, 
i.e. what types of research it encourages and what advantages such a holistic approach would 
provide in comparison with other approaches already used in experimental biology.18 
                                                
18 It is interesting to notice that Griffiths and Gray’s claims about the value of their perspective for biological 
research oscillate between two slightly different positions. Sometimes, they maintain that their holistic vision 
(their “constructive interactionism”) provides both a more heuristic and realistic representation of inheritance 
and evolution than other approaches: “we have strong reservation about multiple inheritance or ‘extended 
replicator’ models. We believe that it is both more biologically realistic and, in the long run, more productive to 
think of the life cycle being reconstructed by a system of resources” (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 196). Other times, 
 18 
Throughout their papers, Griffiths and Gray seem to defend the idea that the Developmental 
Systems Theory (DST) is a programmatic philosophical perspective which can be useful to 
rethink developmental and evolutionary models in theoretical biology19 and to re-orient 
research programs in experimental biology.  
In Gray (2001) and in Griffiths and Gray (2001), they particularly maintain that “the 
benefits of this reconceptualization of evolution in Developmental Systems Theory terms are 
considerable”, and they advance “some suggestions for the kind of research questions […] 
Developmental Systems Theory encourages”. It would promote the following research 
“tactics” about inheritance: the study of extra-genetic inheritance, in particular the 
investigation of whether there are adaptive mechanisms for passing on extra-genetic 
inheritance, the investigation of their effects, and the development of mathematical models for 
studying the impact of different types of extra-genetic inheritance and their co-evolution with 
genetic change; the study of niche construction, and the testing of predictions due to niche 
construction models by using comparative methods. I argue that, if these are the main points 
of the re-orientation Developmental Systems Theory provide in experimental studies about 
inheritance, Griffiths and Gray’s “novel” perspective is not so new and does not involve any 
                                                                                                                                                   
they maintain that their perspective is more biologically realistic in order to think and represent the dynamics of 
inheritance and evolution but, at the same time, they acknowledge the heuristic value and the inevitability of 
distinctions in studying inheritance and evolution in particular cases: “A central theme of the Developmental 
Systems Theory research tradition has been that distinctions between classes of developmental resource should 
be fluid and justified by particular research interests, rather than built into the basic framework of biological 
thought […] The developmental system is not two things, but one, albeit one the can be divided up in many ways 
for different theoretical purposes” (Griffiths and Gray 2004: 419-420). 
19 Griffiths and Gray’s primary aim is to provide a philosophical program which can be translated by biologists 
into a new biological theory: so, they themselves do not explicitly put forward any new theoretical model to 
represent development and evolution. However, they claim that their perspective can provide the philosophical 
clarity to outline a new research program in biology. 
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re-focalization of biological research. Actually, all the research questions suggested by 
Griffiths and Gray are already topics of investigation about inheritance in experimental and in 
theoretical biology and do not need a radical reworking of biological concepts in order to be 
considered by biologists20. Furthermore, all these kinds of investigation can be performed 
only by distinguishing different systems (or factors) of inheritance, and by studying their 
relative independence and their reciprocal influences in particular cases – i.e., what Griffiths 
and Gray refuse from a theoretical point of view21.  
Griffiths and Gray’s holistic idea that organisms inherit the entire developmental 
matrix is certainly more rich and complete than alternative accounts of inheritance limited to a 
                                                
20 I guess that Griffith and Gray would reply to me by suggesting that biological researches focused on extra-
genetic inheritance provide the evidence for the empirical applicability of Developmental Systems Theory in the 
study of inheritance. More generally, Griffiths and Gray seem to consider almost the entire book Cycles of 
Contingency (2001) as a collection of biological works according to Developmental Systems Theory. On the 
contrary, I suggest that, even though these works focus on some major themes of Griffiths and Gray’s version of 
Developmental Systems Theory (i.e., the role of development and of extra-genetic inheritance in evolution, the 
importance of interactions among developmental factors and between organism and environment), they cannot 
be considered as evidence for its empirical applicability in biological research because, contrary to Griffiths and 
Gray’s version of Developmental Systems Theory, they do not characterize inheritance in a holistic way (cf. 
Jablonka and Lamb 2001 and Laland, Odling-Smee, Feldman 2001, in Cycles of Contingency). 
21 For instance, Kitcher (2001), even though sympathetic to the interactionism of Developmental Systems 
Theory, stresses that its empirical applicability in biology is a highly problematic task. In particular, he shows 
that Developmental Systems Theory cannot give an answer to the obvious question a sympathetic biologist 
reading Griffiths and Gray would ask, which is “How do I put these ideas to work in concrete situations?”.  
Kitcher continues: “This does not mean that […] ‘developmental systems theory’ should be abandoned but that 
this kinds of work needed to make them viable pieces of biological theory are specific models for tackling 
interesting problems (rather than philosophical diagnoses of previous errors). It would be very interesting, for 
example, to see a developmental systems analysis of early development in Drosophila […] substituted for some 
part of population genetics” (Kitcher 2001: 413). 
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small set of hereditary factors in additive interaction. Nevertheless, I argue that, if we 
understand inheritance as a whole system composed of multiple quasi-independent sub-
systems of inheritance in non-additive interaction (that is not Griffiths and Gray’s 
representation of the inheritance system), it is more useful and more biologically realistic to 
maintain their relative distinctions in order to understand their interactions and reciprocal 
influences. Griffiths and Gray’s holistic approach turns out to be less informative than the 
representation of inheritance I defend, because it simply tells us that organisms inherit a very 
complex system of non-linear interactions, but it says nothing more about the dynamics 
allowing such a system to be inherited (to re-occur or to be reconstructed in each generation, 
in Griffiths and Gray’s terms).  
For this reason, Griffiths and Gray’s attempt to provide some new basis for research in 
theoretical and experimental biology seems to collapse: by adapting Oyama’s words (Oyama 
2000b: S343), I suggest that what they propose is quite a general revision of biological 
concepts which cannot pretend (at least in the case of the reconceptualization of inheritance) 
to provide a more realistic representation of the biological dynamics and more powerful tools 
for empirical investigations and predictions22. In other words, I do not deny the value of 
Griffiths and Gray’s version of Developmental Systems Theory as an interesting 
philosophical perspective for looking at biological reality with different eyes (i.e., focusing on 
its systematic and interactive character). Nevertheless, when it is in question to translate their 
reconceptualization into new theoretical models and to apply it in empirical studies, its 
holistic character lets out to be problematic.  
In particular, the application of Griffiths and Gray’s proposal in experimental 
biological research reveals an impracticable task: it is impossible to analyze and explain how 
                                                
22 See note 2 about the contrast between what Oyama, Griffiths and Gray claim (2001) about Developmental 
Systems Theory as a theory, and what Griffiths and Gray maintain in their own papers. 
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genetic and extra-genetic factors in interaction (i.e., “the entire developmental matrix”) are 
passed on across generations and have an impact on the evolutionary process without 
analyzing, distinguishing and untangling all systems, or factors, of inheritance. I suggest that 
Developmental Systems Theory does not collapse into an “unmanageable holism” (Sterelny et 
al 1996) only because Griffiths and Gray are compelled to acknowledge one point they refuse 
from the philosophical point of view: they recognize that, in biology, experimental 
investigation without distinctions is an impossible task.  
 
III) No place for some important distinctions in the evolutionary “causal 
parity” thesis 
 
 First of all, let us recall that Griffiths and Gray refuse the conventional definition of 
evolution as change in gene frequency because it attributes an evolutionary causal primacy to 
genes. In contrast, they propose to extend what they call the “causal parity” thesis from 
development to evolution: this means that, according to them, no hereditary factor has a 
privileged causal responsibility either in development or in evolution: even though they can 
have different causal roles, they are all on a par as to explain the evolutionary process.  
Let us examine more in detail Griffiths and Gray’s reasoning to argue for the “causal 
parity” thesis and for their reconceptualization of evolution. First, they claim that “organisms 
inherit much more than just DNA” (Gray 2001: 7), that is many other extra-genetic 
developmental resources (i.e., persistent resources, collectively generated resources, parental 
resources, and self-generated resources) and the interactions among them. Second, they 
suggest that, as an extra-genetic factor is inherited, it plays an evolutionary causal role. Third, 
from the evidence for extra-genetic inheritance and its causal role in evolution, they argue, 
against the conventional view, that all genetic and extra-genetic hereditary factors are “on a 
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par” as to their causal responsibility in the evolutionary process: “the role of genes is not more 
unique than the role of many other factors […]: the supported asymmetry between the role of 
genes and the role of other developmental resources evaporates when closely analyzed […]; 
other developmental resources do just the same” (Griffiths and Gray 1994: 277, 299). In other 
words, they argue that neither metaphysical nor empirical distinctions can be used in order to 
confer a causal primacy to one kind of hereditary factors (e.g., genetic factors) with respect to 
the others (e.g., extra-genetic factors) in evolution (this is what they call the “causal parity” 
thesis)23.  
Finally, on the basis of the “causal parity” thesis, they conclude that evolution cannot 
be defined as change in gene frequency; rather, “evolution can be narrated from a 
Developmental Systems perspective that does not privilege any component of the system” 
(Griffiths and Gray 2004: 420): it is “change over time in the developmental system (DS) of a 
lineage” (Griffiths and Gray 2004: 422)24. Thus, Griffiths and Gray consider the 
Developmental System both as the unit of development and evolution; as they explicitly 
claim, they think that “Evolutionary causes are not different from developmental causes” 
                                                
23 In particular, one way Griffiths and Gray argue in favor of the idea that all genetic and extra-genetic factors 
are on a par as regard their causal responsibility in development and in evolution (i.e., the “causal parity” thesis) 
is by criticizing the idea that only genes are information-carriers: according to them, no characterization of the 
concept of information can isolate genes as privileged cause of development and evolution because any 
definition of information which can apply to genes can also equally apply to all the other extra-genetic factors 
See Lorne’s abstract in this volume. 
24 Griffiths and Gray propose a variety of slightly different definitions of evolution. Here is a sample: “Evolution 
is change over time in the composition of populations of developmental systems” (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 
214); “Evolution is change in the nature of populations of developmental systems” (Griffiths and Gray 2004: 
420); “Evolution is change across generations in the distribution and composition of populations of 
developmental systems” (Gray 1992: 182). 
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(Gray 1992: 187): all hereditary resources and interactions have equally important causal 
roles both in development and in evolution. 
 I argue that Griffiths and Gray’s argument for what they call the “causal parity” thesis 
is not sufficiently rigorous and warranted for the following reason: they do not provide any 
empirical evidence to support the claim that all genetic and extra-genetic hereditary factors 
are equally important as regard their evolutionary causal role and so are on a par as to explain 
evolution. On the contrary, they completely ignore that hereditary factors can differ in some 
important respects, in particular as to the scope of their effects across evolutionary time. 
Actually, I argue that the evolutionary potential of hereditary factors transmitted (stable, in 
Griffiths and Gray’s terms) over many generations is more important than the evolutionary 
potential of hereditary factors transmitted over only one generation because the former, by 
being transmitted more or less reliably across many generations, can be subject to several 
events of selection and drift, and so can potentially lead up to more significant long-term 
evolutionary consequences (for instance, adaptations) than the former.  
By this claim, I do not intend to deny the evolutionary causal role of hereditary factors 
transmitted over only one generation; on the contrary, I even suggest that factors not 
transmitted at all (i.e., in Griffiths and Gray’s terms, not stable over successive generations) 
can have a causal responsibility in evolution as they can play a role in the differential survival 
and reproduction among organisms. Moreover, I do not even intend to defend the causal 
primacy of genes in evolution as conceived by the conventional view. Rather, I want to argue 
that there is a causal asymmetry, not between genes and all the extra-genetic factors, but 
between hereditary factors transmitted over many generations and hereditary factors 
transmitted over only one in terms of the scope of the evolutionary effects they can 
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respectively produce25. In particular, in order to stress some limits of Griffiths and Gray’s 
“causal parity” thesis, I intend to underline the two following points: first, for an extra-genetic 
developmental factor to be hereditary is not a sufficient condition to be on a par with genes as 
an evolutionary cause; second, for a factor to be hereditary is not even a necessary condition 
to have a causal role in evolution.  
So, in contrast to Griffiths and Gray, I suggest to distinguish 1) developmental factors 
which are transmitted over only one generation (e.g., in the case of mammals, cytoplasm 
factors like intracellular chemical gradients and antibodies, methylation marks, extracellular 
chemical influences, etc.), and 2) developmental factors which are transmitted over many 
generations (e.g., in the case of mammals, genes, endosymbionts, mithocondria, some factors 
due to the activity of niche construction, etc.).  
First, let us consider developmental factors transmitted over only one generation (e.g., 
from generation1 to generation2). Such factors explain the resemblance between parents 
(generation1) and offspring (generation2). They can contribute to the differential fitness 
among generation1-organims in a generation1-population: this means that they can have a 
causal responsibility in the differential survival and reproduction among generation1-
organisms, so they can be differentially passed on to generation2-organisms (offspring). 
However, factors transmitted over only one generation (from generation1 to generation2) are 
not transmitted again (from generation2 to generation3): therefore, they can only be causally 
responsible for short-term effects lasting during a limited evolutionary stage (from 
generation1 to generation2), but not across the long-term evolutionary time. Moreover, as 
                                                
25 Hereditary factors transmitted over only one generation and over many generations can vary depending on the 
species considered and the particular contingent history of the organisms concerned (e.g., there are big 
differences between metazoans and other living beings like bacteria as to the transmission of hereditary factors 
over time). It is also worth to note that hereditary factors are different with regard to the unit of evolution 
considered (populations of genes, cells, organisms, etc.). 
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such factors are transmitted over only one generation, they cannot be subjected to several 
events of selection and/or drift, so they can rarely lead up to significant evolutionary effects 
(e.g. adaptations) because they die out after only one generation.  
  Let us now consider the second category of hereditary factors I distinguished above, 
that is the set of developmental factors transmitted over many generations. In contrast to 
factors transmitted over only one generation, hereditary factors belonging to this second 
category can have a causal responsibility in both short-term and long-term evolutionary 
effects. In virtue of the fact that they can be passed on from parents to offspring in many 
successive generations, they can be subjected to several events of selection and/or drift over 
time, so they can lead up to major long-term consequences in evolution: in particular, in the 
case of cumulative selection, they can lead up to adaptations26.  
 On the basis of the distinction of these two categories of developmental factors with 
respect of their evolutionary potential, I advance my criticisms against Griffiths and Gray’s 
“causal parity” thesis in the case of evolution. I argue that all genetic and extra-genetic 
hereditary factors are not on a par as causes of evolution, and so are not equally important in 
order to explain the evolutionary process, because some factors (developmental factors 
transmitted over many generations) can produce more significant long-term evolutionary 
results than others (developmental factors transmitted over only one generation). For instance, 
let us consider inheritance in mammals (e.g., elephants) and investigate the respective 
evolutionary potential of some factor transmitted over many generations (e.g., some allele) 
and of some factor transmitted over only one generation (e.g., a methylation pattern)27.  
                                                
26 As Sterelny et al (1996: 400) says: “If selection is to explain major adaptation it must be cumulative. 
Innovation is the result of a long sequence of selective episodes rather than one”. 
27 It is worth to notice that methylation patterns can also be transmitted over more than one generation: it 
depends on the species and on the contingent history of the organisms considered. For instance, methylation 
marks can be transmitted over many generations in unicellular organisms and in pluricellular organisms with 
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First, let us deal with genetic inheritance and its potential evolutionary consequences. 
Let us imagine a situation in which two allelic forms (A and a) of a gene involved in the 
expression of a phenotypic trait P (e.g. ear size) are present at locus L and have the same 
frequency (50% A and 50% a) in a population of generation1-mammals (e.g., elephants). 
Furthermore, let us assume that, during generation1, environmental conditions change (e.g., 
there is a sudden increase of temperature) and that, in such a new situation, individuals with 
the A allele turn out to be fitter than individuals with the a allele (e.g., because the A allele 
contributes to the production of big ears, which are better than little ones to regulate body 
temperature). Thus, generation1-organisms (elephants) with the A allele are positively 
selected, the A allele is transmitted to the next generation, and so its phenotypic effect (the 
trait “big ear size”) too: in generation2-population, the A allele frequency increases (the a 
allele frequency decreases). If generation2-individuals with the A allele turn out again to be 
fitter than individuals with the a allele (e.g., because the temperature remains high, or because 
it increases further), they are positively selected again, the A allele is transmitted to the next 
generation and, as a result, the phenotypic trait P (“big ear size”) too: in generation3-
population, the frequency of A further increases (the frequency of a further decreases). We 
can imagine that the phenotypic trait P (“big ear size”) is subjected to many events of 
selection in successive generation (i.e., cumulative selection), so that the A allele and the trait 
P (“big ear size”) are transmitted, more or less reliably, over the long-term evolutionary time: 
in this manner, the A allele can come to fix in the population and lead up to a long-term 
evolutionary effect (an adaptation, e.g., a certain big ear size). 
Let us now consider the inheritance of methylation marks, which in mammals are 
rarely transmitted from parents to offspring because they are usually erased in germ-line cells. 
                                                                                                                                                   
asexual reproduction; on the contrary, in mammals they are rarely transmitted over more than one generation 
and, more often, they are not transmitted at all. See Jablonka and Lamb 2005. 
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Anyway, it can happen that they are transmitted over one generation through the process 
biologists call “genomic imprinting”28. So, let us at least assume that some methylation marks 
are transmitted over one generation (from generation1 to generation2). Contrary to the case of 
the A allele described above, the methylation marks cannot be subjected to several events of 
selection and so cannot lead to any major evolutionary effect (an adaptation): in fact, even 
though they can play a causal role in the differential survival and reproduction among 
generation1-organisms (mammals) and they can be passed on from one generation to the next 
(from generation1 to generation2), then they are erased during the embryonic development of 
generation2-offspring and so they cannot be further transmitted (from generation2 to 
generation3). Therefore, as Jablonka and Lamb claim (2005: 140) “such constantly changing 
epigenetic marks are not likely to be the raw material for adaptive evolution”.  
Finally, let us examine a situation concerning both genetic and epigenetic hereditary 
factors, in particular in which epigenetic changes influence the selection of genetic variation 
(i.e., genetic assimilation)29. Let us imagine that the genome of some organisms (e.g., 
mammals) in a generation1-population is characterized by some methylation marks inhibiting 
the expression of some gene G at locus L: genetic variation can accumulate at the silenced 
locus L without being expressed, and the effect is always some phenotype I call P1. Let us 
further imagine that some environmental stress (e.g., a heat-shock) induces a change of the 
methylation marks so that the hidden genetic variation at the silenced genetic locus L is 
                                                
28 During the egg and the sperm production, chromosomes acquire respectively a set of maternal chromatin 
marks and a different set of paternal chromatin marks. However, such chromatin marks are intrinsically transient 
because they are erased when one chromosome passes from one sex to another and new sex-specific marks are 
established. See Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 139-140, 254-258. 
29 Genetic assimilation is a process whereby phenotypic variation induced by environmental stimuli becomes 
genetically fixed in a population: in this manner, phenotypic variation no longer requires the environmental 
signal for expression. 
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revealed: as a result of the induced epigenetic changes, the gene G is expressed and the effect 
is a different phenotype I call P2. The environmentally induced phenotypic variation (P2) can 
be reproduced in the next generation (generation2) if the induced epigenetic changes are 
transmitted from parents to offspring (from generation1 to generation2)30. Or, if the 
environmental stimulus (the heat-shock) lasts in generation2, it can induce again the same 
change of methylation marks, and so the phenotype P2. However, if we assume that 
methylation marks are transmitted over only one generation and we imagine that the 
environmental stimulus wears off after a few generations, we can conclude that, in this case, 
the phenotypic variation P2 can just be a short-term evolutionary effect because it disappears 
from the population after a few generations (when methylation marks are erased or when the 
environmental stimulus wears off). On the contrary, if the hidden genetic variation expressed 
in stressful environmental conditions reveals to be advantageous (i.e., if the induced 
phenotype P2 reveals to be advantageous), it can be positively selected, transmitted from 
parents to offspring, be subjected to further selective events over many generations, and 
finally fix in the population: the phenotypic variant P2 come to be expressed even when 
epigenetic marks are erased and without any inducing environmental stimulus. Only in this 
case (i.e., in virtue of the transmission of some factor over many generations, which in this 
case is the gene G) the phenotype P2 can evolve and turn out to be a long-term significant 
evolutionary effect (e.g., an adaptation).  
The three situations I have just described above, in particular the last one (i.e., the 
process of genetic assimilation), clearly show the difference between, on the one hand, the 
evolutionary potential of factors transmitted over only one generation (e.g., methylation 
marks), which can only have short-term effects limited to the evolutionary step they are 
                                                
30 As I said above, this is not always the case in pluricellular organisms with sexual reproduction, and in 
particular in the case of mammals I consider here. 
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passed on from one generation to the next; on the other hand, the evolutionary potential of 
factors transmitted over many generations (e.g., genes), which can be subjected to cumulative 
events of selection and/or drift and so can produce long-term effects in evolution. Therefore, 
against Griffths and Gray’s “causal parity” thesis in evolution, I maintain that developmental 
factors transmitted over many generations are more important as evolutionary causes and as 
explanatory factors of evolution in comparison with factors transmitted over only one 
generation: the potential evolutionary effects of the former are more significant over time than 
the potential evolutionary scope of the latter.  
 I conclude by underlining both the aspects of Griffiths and Gray’s perspective on 
evolution I agree with and the aspects I criticize. I am sympathetic with their criticisms 
against the traditional characterization of genes (or DNA sequences) as the only transmitted 
master molecules carrying the program for development: genes might have no privileged 
causal responsibility in evolution. More precisely, the major value of Griffiths and Gray’s 
view of evolution is in that they underline the important causal contribution of extra-genetic 
hereditary factors to the differential survival and reproduction among organisms. (i.e., to 
selection, and so to the evolutionary process). Nevertheless, their perspective on extra-genetic 
inheritance turns out to be too radical and not useful for experimental research because of its 
holistic character: even though the “heredity holism” (Griesemer et al 2005: 526) Griffiths 
and Gray advance is valuable, in some respect, because it keeps always in view the context-
dependency of every factor on the others, it risks losing sight of their differences. Actually, in 
order to contrast the conventional gene-centric view of evolution, Griffiths and Gray tend to 
consider all hereditary factors as equally important in evolution, and so ignore some 
distinctions (e.g., the difference I showed above between the evolutionary potential of factors 
transmitted over only one generation and over many generations) which are really important 
to understand the respective causal and explanatory role of hereditary factors as to evolution.  
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Thus, with my present argument, I do not intend to maintain that developmental 
factors transmitted over only one generation, and also factors not transmitted at all, cannot 
have a causal role in evolution and are not relevant to explain the evolutionary process. On 
the contrary, as I stressed above, if such a factor partly determines the survival and the 
reproduction of some organism rather than another, it definitely has a causal role in evolution. 
However, I argue that Griffiths and Gray cannot put such factors on a par with developmental 
factors transmitted over many generations as to their causal role in evolution: indeed, the 
potential evolutionary effects due to factors transmitted over only one generation usually have 
a short-term scope, limited to a few generations, and rarely contribute to more significant 
long-term consequences in evolution.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I put forward three main criticisms of Griffiths and Gray’s reworking of 
the concept of inheritance and evolution.  
First, their concept of expanded and diffused inheritance is certainly richer and more 
complete than other accounts of inheritance limited to a small set of hereditary factors in 
additive interaction; nevertheless, because of its holistic character, its translation into novel 
theoretical models and into alternative analytical tools for researches on biological inheritance 
reveals to be a problematic task.  
Second, by looking at the mechanisms of inheritance and their impact on evolutionary 
dynamics, Griffiths and Gray’s holistic account of inheritance reveals to be less biologically 
realistic than other approaches because of its refusal to distinguish multiple systems of 
inheritance; on the contrary, such a distinction has a central role in biology, not only as a 
heuristic tool, but also as a more realistic representation of evolutionary phenomena.  
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Third, Griffiths and Gray’s evolutionary “causal parity” thesis is not sufficiently 
warranted because it does not take into account the important difference between 
developmental factors transmitted over only one and developmental factors transmitted over 
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